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Abstract: The study analyses the operation and culture of Thai policing and the intersection between policing and 
politics framed by the recommendations of the Police Reform Committee (PRC), 2006—2007. The PRC’s priorities were: 
devolving police administration, especially budgets and personnel management; increasing accountability, especially 
establishing an Independent Complaints’ Committee; and civilianization. Those priorities were seen as clearing the 
ground for development of community-oriented policing longer-term. Interviews were conducted with senior members of 
the PRC. Afterwards non-commissioned officers’ opinions were established through a countrywide survey and follow-up 
in-depth interviews. Their station chiefs were also interviewed. According to PRC members and serving officers’ 
accounts the barriers to reform of police administration were political interference and nepotism, especially corruption of 
appointments, nominations, promotions and transfers. Local policing often involved further interference by informal 
networks of officials, politicians and business. The PRC’s recommendations were shelved due to an unfavourable 
political climate. The paradox was the PRC’s strategies for ‘democratic’ police reform were well-informed and well-
founded but its establishment had been politically motivated and it was not immune to interference by competing political 
factions. The study contributes to debates about moving away from authoritarian policing models in the developing world 
by analysing barriers to the reform of police administration in the Thai context. 
Keywords: Royal Thai Police, police reform, devolved management, police accountability, community-oriented 
policing, police culture, political interference. 
INTRODUCTION 
The study examines the operation and culture of 
Thai policing and the intersection between policing and 
politics in the Thai context through an analysis of what 
were to be failed attempts to reform the Royal Thai 
Police (RTP) post-2006. Thaksin Shinawatra, former 
Police Lieutenant Colonel, Thai business mogul and 
the country’s Prime Minister, had been removed by 
military coup d’état in September 2006. Retired 
General Surayud Chulanont, former Army-in-Chief and 
member of the King’s Privy Council, was installed as 
the head of an interim ‘civilian’ government. Elections 
were deferred until December 2007. Surayud signed an 
order to establish a Police Reform Committee, 2006—
2007 (PRC2009). The committee had a substantial 
budget and a period of one year to report back with its 
recommendations and to submit draft legislation for 
reform. The purpose of the present study is not only to 
analyse the intentions that lay behind the PRC’s 
recommendations but also to examine the opinions of 
serving police officers in the RTP about the 
committee’s priorities for reform, which were for 
administrative decentralization of the force and the 
establishment of mechanisms for police accountability. 
That process will allow us to understand how the RTP  
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operates and its occupational and organisational 
culture as a key Thai institution and the reasons for its 
lack of reform. The Chair of the PRCwas retired Police 
General Vasit Dejkunjorn, former Chief of the Royal 
Court Police (Suriyasarn and Moore 2006). 
The Wider Thai Context 
Thailand is a developing country designated as 
‘upper middle income’ (World Bank 2012). Its total 
economic output in terms of gross domestic product 
(GDP) may well place it in the top 20 per cent of 
countries globally but in terms of per capita gross 
national income (GNI) it ranks in the bottom half only 
(World Bank 2011). Thailand is cast asan economic 
‘success story’ but it has much remaining poverty and 
stark income, education and health disparities and an 
on-going state of emergency in its Southern provinces 
(McCargo 2006). In addition, Thailand has endemic 
corruption problems bound up with a culture of informal 
networks of power which operate through patronage 
(Ockey 1998) and involve the abuse of formal power 
[itthiphon] by the application of informal influence 
[amnat] (Tamada 1991) made worse by the presence 
of godfathers [jao pho] (McVey 2000) and election 
vote-buying in the country’s rural provinces (Callahan 
2005). Transparency International’s 2011 corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) ranked the country down at 
eightieth position (Roberts and Provost 2011). 
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To locate the RTP among the country’s other 
institutions at the time the police reform committee was 
established, analysis of World Values Survey data 
(WVS-Thailand 2007) indicate that some seventy per 
cent of Thais had confidence in their justice system. A 
similar proportion expressed confidence in the 
traditional Buddhist temple (McCargo2004). However, 
citizens appeared split over the country’s powerful 
military (Chaloemtiarana 2007). Fifty-one per 
centreported confidence in the Armed Forces 
immediately following the 2006 coup d’état. Citizens 
were also split over the country’s factional media 
(McCargo 2000). WVS survey results also indicate that 
only a minority of the public had confidence in the Civil 
Service in general (44 per cent) and the Royal Thai 
Police in particular (43 per cent). There was less 
confidence still in Parliament (33 per cent) and fewer 
than one-in-four of the Thai WVS participants had 
confidence in the country’s political parties (23 per 
cent). Many also mistrusted big business in Thailand 
(25 per cent). Corruption as a growing ‘political issue’ 
since the late 1980s is a major reason for the 
populace’s lack of confidence in Thai bureaucracy, civil 
servants, government and business interests, including 
corruption of the RTP (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 
1996: 1; 108). The WVS-Thailand survey did not ask 
about the country’s other key institution, the monarchy 
and King (McCargo 2005). 
The Modern History of the Royal Thai Police 
The modern force came to the fore in the 1950s 
under Police General Phao Sriyanon
1
 when it was 
funded, equipped and trained with support from the 
United States, strategically to counter the perceived 
threat of communism in Southeast Asia 
(Fineman1997). The police became powerful along 
with the Thai military. The end game in a struggle 
between competing factions within the ‘armed forces’ 
saw Phao allowed to go into exile in 1957, having 
                                            
1
Foreigner Captain Ames was brought in to set up a police brigade to operate 
alongside the traditional Siamese patrol brigade in Bangkok in the mid 
nineteenth century. From 1875 the new brigade operated under regulations, 
duties and ordinances for policing the city. Jardine followed from British India. 
Lawson then amalgamated and modernized the police and patrol brigades to 
form a municipal constabulary on the British model at the beginning of the 
1900s. A separate provincial brigade was built up along military lines for Siam’s 
internal and border security. The two were brought together as a single 
department in 1915. October 13 became ‘Police Day’. The value of the police 
to maintain political power became apparent during the 1932 revolution to 
establish constitutional monarchy. Its role in military totalitarian government 
emerged during Field Marshal LuangPhibunsongkhram’s first period as Prime 
Minister, 1938—44, especially the Santibarn (Special Branch). Police General 
PhaoSriyanon’s extra-legal operations during the post-war period, 1948—57, 
were prosecuted by an inner-circle of officers, the ‘Knights of the Diamond 
Ring’. Phao’s (prophetic) motto for the modern force was, ‘There is nothing 
under the sun the Thai police cannot do.’ (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004: 153). 
amassed a personal fortune. The faction led by Field 
Marshal Sarit Thanarat wrested control in a military 
coup d’état. Sarit became Prime Minister in another 
coup d’état in 1958, and eventually, he acted as Chief 
of Police as well. His period of leadership has been 
characterized as ‘despotic paternalism’ 
(Chaloemtiarana 2007) and his authoritarian legacy 
continued after his death. 
A decade later student protests against military rule 
were met with police brutality and killing of 
demonstrators in 1973 and 1976 (Baker and 
Phongpaichit 2009). The RTP’s involvement was 
review edonly later in 1979 but readjustments and 
modifications of the force did not include any major 
reorganization (PRC 2009:4). Indeed, after a decade of 
economic development under Premocrarcy in the 
1980s (Laothamas 1992) another coup d’état led to a 
new wave of mass protests in Bangkok in 1992 (Baker 
and Phongpaichit 2009). There were further deaths and 
outrage over the RTP’s response. Pressure mounted 
for more open and participatory forms of governance 
as a whole, leading to Thailand’s 1997 Constitution 
(Connors 1999). Under that ‘democratic’ reform: 
legislation for a National Police Board aimed to provide 
more representation through elected officials; the RTP 
was moved away from the bureaucratic Ministry of 
Home Affairs and made responsible to the elected 
Prime Minister’s Office; the position of Parliamentary 
Ombudsman was set up to receive complaints about 
the Civil Service, including officers of the RTP; and; 
Regional Police Boards were established to prompt 
public involvement. 
According to the PRC’s Chair: 
‘The Royal Thai Police is an inherited 
product of the country’s aged-old feudalist 
governing system. It is strongly 
centralized, with a powerful 
Commissioner-General at the top, 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister. 
Originally connected with the Royal Thai 
Army, the RTP is vaguely regarded as “the 
fourth branch of the armed forces.”’ 
(PRC 2009:i) 
Establishment of the Police Reform Committee 
General elections saw Thaksin Shinawatra assume 
power in 2001 (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005). He 
was from Chiang Mai in the North originally and he was 
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the first Prime Minster to come from the ranks of the 
police. He had built a business empire which survived 
the economic collapse of 1997 (Phongpaichit and 
Baker 2004). In government, under Thaksinomics, his 
efficiency drive to introduce modern management 
principles to the Civil Service seemed to have little 
consequence for the RTP. The Police Law of 2004 did 
require local boards to be set up at police station level 
throughout the country, to promote community 
involvement, but in practice, such boards supported the 
operation of informal networks among local police, 
officials, politicians and business, rather than represent 
wider community interests. Thaksin was re-elected in 
the general elections of 2005 only to be removed in the 
coup d’état of 2006. His removal was described as a 
‘good coup’ by the Thai establishment (Connors and 
Hewison 2008). His political opponents despised his 
methods and populist brand of politics. They 
complained about autocratic leadership and especially 
misuse and misdirection of the RTP as a political tool. 
They pointed to the prosecution of his ‘War on Drugs’ 
policy (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004:253—67). 
Thaksin went into exile abroad to avoid charges of tax 
evasion and corruption in 2007. As the PRC’s Chair put 
it: ‘the police are constantly criticized for negligence, 
bias, abusage of power and brutality’ (PRC 2009:ii). 
The Police Reform Committee’s Claims to 
Legitimacy 
From the viewpoint of the Thai establishment, the 
PRC was able to claim legitimacy on a number of 
grounds: first, the self-evident need to check the 
rampant abuse of police power for political ends; 
second, pressure on the upper echelons of the RTP to 
agree to reform; third, widespread mistrust, lack of 
confidence and unpopularity of the police; fourth, the 
public status of retried Police General Vasit 
Dejkunjornas the committee’s Chair
2
 as a well-known 
figure with years of distinguished service in the force, 
separate from RTP Headquarters; fifth, the makeup 
and expertise of Vasit’s committee, allied to a national 
consultation process; and finally; the committee’s 
professionalism in justifying its recommendations by 
reference to aspects of modern, international police 
administration which could be adapted to fit the Thai 
context. The PRC’s report stated that the aim of 
                                            
2
Vasit was a commentator for Matichon publishing group and well known as the 
author of a series of detective novels about Thai police operations. His novels’ 
heroes were police inspectors who fought crime, godfathers, politicians and 
corruption hindered by their bosses and the administration (‘Special Branch’ 
1996; ‘Chief Inspector’ 1994; ‘Savage Inspector’ 1987). 
government policy was to develop a police organization 
which was ‘transparent, accountable, responsible and 
modernized ... integrated within the whole justice 
process ... [which] with decentralization ... will be able 
to serve the people more efficiently, equally and fairly, 
and will be more credible and trusted ...’ (PRC 
2009:3—5). Vasit had served as Chief of the Royal 
Court Police for some years and he wrote a popular 
memoir in his retirement called ‘In His Majesty’s 
Footsteps’ (Suriyasarn and Moore 2006). Vasit 
explained how the King had become a role model for 
his own actions. He commended Thais, especially 
government officials and public servants, to be guided 
by the principle of selfless service to their country. That 
located Vasit within a particular ‘political’ camp 
(McCargo 2005). 
The Police Reform Committee’s Recommendations 
The PRC set up five sub-committees, responsible 
for: (1) restructuring police administration; (2) reviewing 
human resource and professional development; (3) 
examining the police’s place within the criminal justice 
system as a whole; (4) public relations and consultation 
during the committee’s reporting process; and (5) to 
provide academic support and draft legislation to 
implement the committee’s recommendations (PRC 
2009: 10—11). The PRC’s ‘wish list’ for the reform of a 
closed, authoritarian and hierarchical institution that 
employed traditional policing methods was to: 
I. Decentralize the RTP to metropolitan, provincial 
and other police bureaus, including devolved 
budgets, personnel administration, transfers and 
promotions; 
II. Create public participation in police 
administration through PPCs (Police Policy 
Committees); 
III. Monitor police performance and relations with 
the public through an ICC (Independent 
Committee of Complaints); 
IV. Transfer a range of non-police functions to other 
state agencies; 
V. Develop the investigations’ system through a 
central investigative directorate; 
VI. Reorganize operations at the station level 
towards more autonomous, problem-focused, 
community-oriented policing and more 
representative local boards; 
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VII. Develop police recruitment, education and 
training; 
VIII. Review police salaries and welfare as separate 
within the Civil Service; 
IX. Eliminate military ranks for non-commissioned 
officers (NCOs) and develop career progression 
in its place, related to civilianization of the force, 
and; 
X. Establish an office for justice system reform 
generally. 
The PRC’s final reportlaidout a two-stage process 
along with implementation strategies. Reform would 
start with an Office for Police Reform (OPR) run 
separately from the existing National Police Agency 
and reporting independently to a changed National 
Police Commission (PRC 2009: 34). The OPR was 
only the first step towards the PRC’s long-term goal, 
which was its tenth and final recommendation, to enact 
‘joined up’ justice system reform (PRC 2009: 30). 
The PRC saw its first three recommendations as its 
key priorities at stage-one of the reform process: 
decentralizing the current administration to Police 
Bureaus; opening up the administration through 
requiring Police Bureaus work with Police Policy 
Committees (PPCs); and making the administration 
accountable through the operation of an Independent 
Committee of Complaints (ICC). The PRC wanted to 
decentralize police administration to regional, 
metropolitan and other bureau levels, especially 
devolved police budgets and devolved personnel 
administration of the RTP’s current system of 
appointments, nominations, transfers and promotions 
(ANT&P). Reformed PPCs would be responsible for 
formulating policy for their respective devolved 
organizations. The thinking was: ‘... with appropriate 
and efficient management, the PPCs will become a 
shield against political interference while insuring 
accountability’ (PRC 2009:22). It is notable that the 
PRC drafted legislation quite separately for its new ICC 
to act as an independent oversight mechanism. In 
practical terms, the PRC was also concerned about the 
scale of interference in the day-to-day work of 
investigating officers at the station level, detectives and 
interrogators, under existing practices and police 
culture and they recommended setting up a central 
investigative directorate too (PRC 2009: 25). 
Investigating officers were used to employing quasi-
legal methods ignorant of the law and citizens’ rights. 
They were poorly trained and over worked on relatively 
low salaries, and so, open to outside influence, and to 
interference from their station chiefs, and their chiefs’ 
bosses, who had the ‘final say’ on the prosecution of 
cases. 
The PRC’s fourth through eighth recommendations 
– focusing on everyday operations and ways of 
working, recruitment and training, resources and work 
conditions – were presented as stage-two of the reform 
process in a move towards ‘community-oriented’ 
policing. The priorities set out as stage-one were 
deemed essential because they were pre-requisites to 
the development of policing using modern methods to 
international standards at stage-two. Of course, those 
same priorities would also serve to disable the RTP as 
a factor in Thai politics. The PRC provided justifications 
for its own reform program by reference to experiences 
and models of policing elsewhere as required. Its 
recommendations were framed by community-oriented 
reform programs involving ‘decentralization of 
command’, ‘increased accountability towards the 
public’ and ‘civilianization’of the RTP where chief 
among the internal impediments to reform were 
existing police culture and norms ‘grounded in 
traditional notions of the police role’ and the 
‘bureaucratic isolation’ of reform programs within the 
administrative hierarchy, as identified by Skolnick and 
Bayley (1988). Practical implications of the PRC’s 
proposals would be worked out as the second stage of 
reform.
3
 
METHODS 
The study used both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. A large-scale questionnaire survey was 
combined with in-depth interviews of serving officers. 
Permission for the study was granted only after a 
formal presentation at RTP Headquarters in late-2008
4
. 
Contact was then made with the Police Chief’s Office of 
the Metropolitan Bureau (Capital—Bangkok), Provincial 
Police Region 8 (Upper North—Chang Mai) and 
Provincial Police Region 5 (Upper South—Surat Thani) 
to gain access to police stations. Police stations were 
selected at random in advance from among ‘large’ and 
                                            
3
Different members of the PRC were advocates of particular models of police 
administration, such as community aspects of the Japanese policing model 
(Kittiyaluck2007), but without necessarily acknowledging fully the challenges 
facing such models. Their purpose was to lend authority to the 
recommendations for reform. 
4
At that time the Prime Minister’s nomination of a new National Police Chief 
had been blocked by the National Police Board, due to manoeuvring among 
political factions. The Acting Commissioner-General had no absolute authority 
in law to oversee administration of the RTP. 
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‘small’ stations in each region.
5
 Station chiefs were 
contacted by their bosses. The interviews and survey 
got underway in mid-2009 and lasted for six months. 
Fieldwork was undertaken by an RTP officer on 
research leave. Original preparations for the study had 
involved a series of visits by the RTP officer and his UK 
collaborator throughout 2008 to spend time with the 
officer’s former classmates from the National Police 
Academy some ten years after graduation, or with 
contacts introduced by those classmates. Visits were 
made to classmates and contacts posted to roles and 
sections across the country.
6
 Conversations took place 
during down time in restaurants, pubs and clubs away 
from operations and involved catching up on police 
news and careers and explaining to the UK outsider 
about Thai society and policing. Preparatory 
ethnographic work was done to understand the 
situation on the ground prior to undertaking the full 
study. In addition, an expert adviser to the PRC 
provided an introduction to a senior bureaucrat of the 
Justice Department who had worked on the PRC, and 
by snowballing, led to senior members of the PRC, and 
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The station in central Bangkok had more than 300 officers; the metropolitan 
and ‘medium’ provincial stations had between 100 and 300; the ‘small’ stations 
had less than 100. 
6
Classmates and contacts were not posted to police stations selected at 
random for the full study. 
ultimately, to its Chair. Interview and survey materials 
for the full study with serving police officers were first 
piloted by the research team in early-2009. 
Brewer (1993) observed that it is often necessary 
when researching the police to tackle the negative 
effects of sensitivity and reactivity by making pragmatic 
compromises which depart from textbook practice 
during his study of routine policing at the time of ‘the 
Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. The present study also 
had to compromise on what RTP managers and station 
chiefs required and because it combines different data 
collection methods with different groups of informants it 
also had to address the challenge of triangulating 
results. According to Brewer and Hunter (2006: 4), the 
fundamental strategy for triangulation is to attack a 
research problem with an arsenal of methods that have 
non-overlapping weaknesses in addition to their 
complementary strengths. The make-up of the survey 
sample of non-commissioned police officers (NCOs) 
may have been compromised by hierarchical selection 
and co-optation of participants by their superiors, for 
example, but NCOs’ responses to the self-completion 
questionnaire and their accounts from the face-to-face 
interviews can be compared with each other, and also 
with the interview accounts of their station chiefs. As it 
transpired, sample distributions and general 
Table 1a: Questionnaire Survey of Non-Commissioned Police Officers, RTP 2009 
Bangkok Chiang Mai Surat Thani 
Province Province n = 
Central Large Metro’ Medium 
Medium Small Medium Small 
Total* 
Distributed 150 75 150 75 150 75 675 
Returned 146 73 133 72 130 69 623 
 
Table 1b: National and Survey Sample Distributions Across Police Sections, RTP 2009 
Police sections National NCO Sample Per cent difference Sample n = 
Traffic 10% 10% 0% 60 
Crime Suppression 30% 33% +3% 211 
Crime Investigation 15% 7% -8%* 43 
Case Interrogation 20% 19% -1% 118 
General Affairs 20% 28% +8%* 173 
Others 5% 3% -2% 18 
Total 100% 100%  623 
Notes:  
*Statistically significant differences from national distribution, Chi-sq.(5) = 55.13, p < 0.01. 
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representativeness appeared sound and NCOs 
seemed willing to participate. 
Table 1a shows the survey sample quotas and 
numbers of completed questionnaires. Station chiefs 
chose to delegate responsibility to promoted officers to 
pick participants in the station’s various sections.
7
 
NCOs might opt out due to lack of interest, lack of time 
or to avoid trouble. Chiefs assured confidentiality. The 
response rate was over 90 per cent (n=623 out of 675) 
even when spoiled returns were counted. Concluding 
written comments were made by one third of the survey 
participants. Table 1b compares the make-up of the 
survey sample with national figures. There was over-
representation of the ‘general affairs’ section and 
under-representation of the ‘crime investigation’ section 
but good matches for the’ traffic’, ‘crime suppression’ 
and ‘case interrogation’ sections. The modal age of 
participants was 40—44 years with 21—25 years of 
service. The majority were high school graduates at 
most. Two-thirds held the top NCO rank of Senior 
Sergeant Major. One-quarter were women officers. 
Women NCOs worked desk jobs in administration or as 
PAs to senior officers.
8
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of in-depth interviews 
conducted for the study. The interviews with serving 
                                            
7
The investigation section comprises case-detectives in the field and 
interrogation section case-investigators in the office. The suppression section 
is responsible for serious crime, such as relating to mafia, drugs and murders, 
supervised centrally and operating across stations. 
8
Women were admitted as recruits to the elite officer class of the Police Cadet 
Academy for the first time in 2009. Historically, the Pre-Cadet Academy 
combined prospective cadets with ambitions to join the upper echelons of the 
Army, Navy, Air Force and Police to instil a military ethos. 
officers were done separately from the survey, and 
where officers were willing, recorded for transcription. 
The aim was to interview one NCO from each the 
sections of operation in each of the randomly selected 
police stations, and the station chief. It proved hard to 
arrange interviews with crime suppression officers in 
larger stations. In central Bangkok, for example, 
repeated visits were required because even desk 
sergeants were involved in the ‘mob control’ of political 
demonstrations in the capital.
9
 Twenty-one out of the 
target total of thirty NCOs were interviewed in a 
separate room and five more NCOs were interviewed 
while in the presence of a senior officer. The six station 
chiefs were interviewed afterwards in their own office. 
Two chiefs refused to be recorded and one of those 
would not allow note-taking. Opinions were treated as 
confidential and managers were not given access to 
data. In addition, the Chair, two senior members, a 
senior bureaucrat and two experts from the PRC were 
interviewed. 
FINDINGS 
Non-Commissioned Officers’ Responses to the 
Questionnaire Survey 
The self-completion questionnaire began by asking 
NCOs about choosing a career in the police from 
                                            
9
Mass demonstrations and occupations by the anti-Thaksin PAD (People’s 
Alliance for Democracy) Yellow Shirts returned to Bangkok in 2008 after the 
results of the new general elections returned a pro-Thaksin government, even 
after his removal and exile abroad. Opposition Red Shirts staged mass 
protests thereafter when leaders of that new pro-Thaksin elected government 
were also required to stand down by the Constitutional Court. Political turmoil 
continued. 
Table 2: Interviews with Officers and Reform Committee Members, RTP 2009—2010 
Bangkok Chiang Mai Surat Thani 
Province Province 
n = 
Central 
Large 
Metro’ 
Medium Medium Small Medium Small 
Total 
a. Station Chiefs: 1
$
 1 1 1 1^ 1 6 
b. Non-commissioned officers: 3 5 4 5 4 5 26 
(Traffic 1 1 1* 1 1 1 6) 
(Crime Suppression 0 1 0 1 0 1 3) 
(Crime Investigation 0 1 1* 1 1* 1 5) 
(Case Interrogation 1* 1 1 1 1 1 6) 
(General affairs 1* 1 1 1 1 1 6) 
c. Committee: the chair, 2 sub-committee chairs, senior civil servant and 2 expert advisers to the committee 6 
Notes: 
*Interviews conducted in the presence of a senior officer. 
$
Neither tape-recording nor note-taking allowed; ^No tape-recording allowed. 
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among a list of reasons. The majority answered 
pragmatically, ‘job security’ (62 per cent of NCOs). The 
sample was split on the notion of ‘public service’ (only 
48 per cent agreed that reasons included ‘a desire to 
serve the community’) and the majority saw police work 
neither as ‘varied and challenging’ (60 per cent) nor as 
offering ‘opportunities for career advancement’ (70 per 
cent). NCOs’ responses gave a picture of a rank-and-
file career as routine work in a fixed role without 
variety, challenges or progression but with job security 
on moderate incomes and benefits. The majority saw 
they had joined an organization with an ethos of 
following orders in the chain of command without 
question or initiative where they were accountable to 
their superiors only. Opinions emphasize an 
authoritarian approach with traditional methods of 
patrol and arrest rather than delegating command, 
engaging with the public, taking initiative or carrying out 
problem-oriented policing. 
Non-commissioned officers’ preferred option among 
different answers to another (two-part) question about 
the reasons why ‘policing is becoming harder and the 
crime rate increasing’ and various strategies by which 
‘policing could be more effective, crime controlled and 
law enforced’ also emphasized an authoritarian 
approach employing traditional methods. The majority 
chose the explanation ‘on their own, police officers 
cannot enforce the law and maintain stability and order’ 
(65 per cent) but combined with a strategy of giving the 
police ‘more authority and powers’ (63 per cent) to fight 
crime. That is the public should support them, for 
instance as their informants, and allow them the power 
and authority to get the job done. Indeed, the majority 
opinion of NCOs was not compatible with 
decentralization of command, accountability to the 
public and civilianization of ways of working and 
interactions in everyday policing. The PRC had 
envisaged the use of more community-oriented policing 
methods happening at the second-stage of reform after 
the resolution of deep-seated institutional problems 
with the RTP’s administration. 
The PRC believed reform would need to be top-
down with the devolution of power and authority 
making senior officers responsible at regional, 
metropolitan and other bureau level. Non-
commissioned officers believed power and authority 
concerning policies and operations were devolved 
already (Table 3a and 3b, 82 per cent) and the majority 
saw military rank structures and relationships with 
superiors as suited to the RTP as it was constituted 
(Table 3c and 3d, 62 and 61 per cent, respectively). 
They were divided on the RTP’s personnel 
administration, and particularly the system of annual 
police movements (ANP&T). One-half of the NCO 
survey sample saw the current system as an effective 
way of doing things, given the alternatives, and as an 
integral to police culture (Table 3e, 53 per cent). NCOs 
were unambiguous about the effect people of influence 
[amnat] and politicians had on the RTP’s administration 
(Table 3f, 80 per cent agreed outside interference was 
the norm). 
The PRC saw establishing an ICC and PPCs as 
priorities in making Bureau managers accountable 
within a devolved administration, alongside a reformed 
National Police Commission. Non-commissioned 
officers certainly agreed that public confidence and 
trust would improve if the RTP’s practices were made 
more transparent (Table 4a, 87 per cent). Nonetheless, 
the majority regarded the existing internal audit system 
for monitoring police misconduct as ‘sufficient’ and 
‘effective and efficient’ (Table 4b and 4c, 63 and 60 per 
cent respectively) despite a similar proportion of NCOs 
also agreeing that ‘too often, the criminal activities of 
officers, such as drink driving, theft, drug possession 
and bribery go unpunished’ (Table 4d, 68 per cent).
10
 
They were clear about the quasi-legal and results-
driven methods used by the RTP, and condoned by 
                                            
10
The great majority also agreed that under the internal audit system the 
treatment of officers was not equal when it came to investigating and 
disciplining cases of misconduct. 
Table 3:  NCOs’ Opinions of Police Management and Administration, RTP 2010 (N = 623) 
Police management and administration: Agreement 
a. National policy usually has been formed on the basis of what Provincial Police Regions 1 to 9 and the Metropolitan 
Bureau agree. 
82% 
b. Regional Police Chiefs have absolute power in terms of police management and operations.  82% 
c. The current ranks structure is suitable for police management and should not be changed. 62% 
d. Only the minority of superiors put pressure on rank-and-file officers in respect of their police jobs. 61% 
e. In general, police officers have been appointed and transferred based on effectiveness for individual police jobs. 53% 
f. Both influential persons and politicians have strongly affect police administration 80% 
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their superiors. Rather than ‘respecting civil rights,’ 
ends justified the means ‘when catching criminals’ 
(Table 4e and 4f, 78 and 73 per cent respectively). 
Non-commissioned officers’ opinions about priority 
recommendations for transparency were ambiguous. 
They saw positives but understood that such 
mechanisms would run counter to established 
practices. The current internal audit system suited 
police culture and the workings of an organization run 
along quasi-military lines. 
Non-commissioned officers’ pragmatic opinions 
about the RTP’s closed and hierarchical administrative 
system can be set against their belief that more contact 
with the general public would be a good thing (93 per 
cent). Indeed, the great majority of NCOs wanted to 
see improvements both in transparency and public 
confidence (91 per cent). Seeming contradictions in 
responses to different survey questions reflected NCOs 
recognition of how the RTP operated in reality, with its 
own internal logic and purposes. Meaning most NCOs 
also agreed that senior managers should be made 
accountable to the law rather than the Prime Minister’s 
Office (90 per cent) and that senior managers should 
not play the major role in any reorganization of RTP 
administration (72 per cent). Civilianization of the RTP 
was also seen as a necessary precursor to the reform 
of policing methods (71 per cent). Nonetheless, forty 
per cent of NCOs still did not agree that the RTP’s ‘top 
operational priority should be to serve the needs of 
individual citizens and local communities’ and more 
than seventy-five per cent remained sceptical about the 
PRC’s strategy of ‘formal reorganisation and 
restructuring on a national basis’ as initiating changes 
in policing locally. 
Non-Commissioned Officers’ Responses to a 
Concluding Open-Ended Question 
One-third of NCOs were expressly critical of current 
police administration and chose to write further 
comments in the final open-ended section of the self-
completion questionnaire. Comments were revealing of 
drivers behind RTP administration and lack of 
accountability. Non-commissioned officers wrote that 
senior officers favoured their ‘own’ and that managers 
were not accountable for decisions in ANP&T and 
procedures were opaque and uncertain. It was 
suggested a ‘spoil system’ [patronage system]
11
 
operated to benefit senior officers, often involving 
considerable sums of money. They felt frustrated, 
bypassed with little opportunity for movement to better 
or different positions based on performance and merit. 
They wrote that the rank-and-file were not encouraged 
to serve the public, and instead, they focused their 
energies on working for senior officers, acting as their 
‘followers’ in anticipation of returns. One NCO wrote: 
‘Police administration is poor. Duties are decided 
based solely on the relationships you have.’ 
Non-commissioned officers wrote that too often– 
from Police Generals to Constables, especially senior 
officers who were best placed to abuse their status – 
officers took ‘full advantage’ of a police career for 
personal gain, disregarding their duty to the public. One 
NCO wrote: ‘Officers should have moral principles, not 
just focus on the “advantageous” aspects of their jobs.’ 
They reported interference in operations and 
investigations without apparent justification. Some 
superiors were even said to embezzle the ‘advantages’ 
of those under their command, including NCOs’ special 
allowances earmarked for ‘mob’ control of 
demonstrators or for ‘special’ operations such as those 
involving narcotics. They complained that their 
superiors criticized them arbitrarily, not only about 
                                            
11
A spoil system is one where after work to secure a position of power and 
authority a faction provides jobs as reward for the support of its followers and 
as incentive for future support of the faction, originating from corrupt political 
practices in the United States. 
Table 4: NCOs’ Opinions About Police Transparency and Conduct, RTP 2010 (N = 623) 
Police transparency and misconduct: Agreement 
a. The transparency of police practices need to be improved to develop greater trust and confidence from the community. 87% 
b. The internal audit system is sufficient enough to deal with cases of police misconduct. 63% 
c. The internal audit system is effective and efficient enough to supervise police activities. 60% 
d. Too often, police managers are not able to punish criminal activity of officers (for example, drink driving, theft, drug 
possession, bribery). 
68% 
e. When given a choice between respecting citizens’ rights and catching criminals, senior police administrators emphasize 
catching criminals. 
73% 
f. Senior police administrators are only interested in the number of arrests and convictions, not in how results are achieved. 78% 
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professional matters. In all of this, they wrote the rank-
and-file had no effective means of protection against 
such abuses. They wrote that: resources for 
operations, such as weapons and equipment, were 
limited, old and unreliable; training was inadequate, 
outmoded and incompetent, and; workloads in key 
areas were unsustainable without enough staff to 
complete the section’s duties. 
Non-commissioned officers also wrote that police 
bureaucracy was a major obstacle to their operations 
locally. Often they had to gain permission before acting 
and senior officers might check with headquarters also. 
The chain of command was slow, inflexible and 
unresponsive, deterring and undermining local 
initiative. Are current the me was that police 
administration was subject to interference by 
‘influential’ people and politicians, locally and 
nationally.
12
  
Interview Accounts of Non-Commissioned Officers, 
Station Chiefs and Committee Members 
It was difficult to engage the majority of NCOs with 
alternative notions of more open and participatory 
policing during the interviews. Non-commissioned 
officers are not expected to have opinions about such 
matters. The basis for their accounts was established 
local practice and organizational culture. On the other 
hand, station chiefs were familiar with thinking behind 
community-oriented methods– delegating decision-
making, changed emphasis in patrols, working on 
public relations and involvement, developing crime-
prevention programmes and so on– but only two of the 
six station chiefs actually believed in such approaches: 
one chief in metropolitan Bangkok and another chief in 
the rural South. As was found with the survey results, 
and echoing the opinions of their station chiefs, only a 
minority of NCOs were critical of current RTP 
administration and strongly supported change in face-
to-face interviews. For example, rank-and-file 
interviewees often claimed the RTP had been 
decentralized under previous police legislation (2004 
and 1997). A Police Inspector in Crime Suppression 
interrupted one of his NCOs during an interview to say: 
Senior police managers and the 
authorities claim that it is decentralized. In 
                                            
12
The example was given of failure to appoint a new Commissioner-General at 
the national level. 
practice, senior police managers at Police 
Headquarters and politicians at both local 
and national level intervene in police 
management in respect of police transfers 
and nominations. Most police officers 
realize this but no one complains or 
disputes it. All of us have discipline and 
must follow orders. 
(Inspector, Suppression, large station, Upper North) 
As to the decentralization of personnel 
administration, according to a Station Chief from the 
South, the operation of the RTP’s system of annual 
movements (ANP&T) remained at the control of RTP 
Headquarters and was subject to institutionalized 
practices of manipulation and interference: 
…the spoil system [patronage system] 
remains in the force; therefore, promotion 
is not based on police morality and 
ability... Senior police managers at HQ, 
Provincial Police Regions and politicians 
regularly reach agreements about 
transfers so as to put their own officers 
into the desired positions. The 
connections which a police officer has are 
the top priority, rather than the officer’s 
ability ... It may appear this 
[decentralization] has been regulated by 
police law [2004], but police law, in 
practice, is not the main consideration 
when it comes to police transfer and 
nominations…I agree that the Chief of 
each Provincial Police Region should have 
the final say in moving officers in their own 
regions ... In practice the Chiefs of 
Provincial Police Regions just listen to 
what their bosses command and then just 
do it.  
(Chief of smallstation, Upper South) 
Current personnel administration was centralized 
and driven by informal networks of power and 
influence. The organization’s annual round police 
movements was manipulated to consolidate power. 
Factions within the force competed for dominance. 
As to the PRC’s recommendation for greater public 
involvement through establishing PPCs at the bureau 
level, followed by the development of more community-
oriented policing and committees at the station level, 
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one Station Chief in the North felt local people did not 
understand what was meant by ‘public participation’: 
The notion of community engagement now 
is enacted by Police Law [2004]. Due to 
this law, a local police board has been set 
up at every police station. Members are 
from various agencies, as local 
representatives, such as Colleges or 
District Offices, but they know nothing 
about policing. In practice, members who 
attend relay to me various petty 
problems... actual policing and serious 
matters are not brought up. Some 
members have never attended a meeting, 
even elected officials like attorneys who 
know the justice system. Often members 
do not feel any responsibility to act as the 
public’s representatives. 
(Chief of large station, Upper North) 
A former senior officer was damning about the 
makeup of current police boards: 
Station chiefs often choose members from 
among the middle and upper class of 
society as these are the groups able to 
fund policing. We have to realize that 
funding is low and station chiefs face 
budget deficits. It is essential for the police 
locally to have social connections able to 
support their operations... 
The major problem of local boards now is 
the recruitment procedure is left to what 
the station chief decides. Personal 
relationships are a fundamental aspect of 
membership. Influential people or local 
politicians wish to partake in local boards 
for their own benefits. Resources and 
equipment are provided and contributions 
made when requested. In turn, the police 
turn a blind eye when some board 
members break the law... 
Influential people, businessmen and 
others, serve on the Regional Police 
Boards in order to maintain a close 
relationship with the police. These 
‘representatives’ in the guise of legitimate 
community spokespersons say they are 
satisfied with regional arrangements and 
with local policing. They do this to serve 
their own interests. It has been widely said 
that board members act like ATM 
machines for the police. 
(Senior member of PRC) 
A bureaucrat who had been assigned to work with 
the PRC offered arguments which are often used to 
explain the need to retain centralized administrative 
control in the Thai context. The country was not ready 
to operate more open and participatory structures. 
Chaos would ensue due to lack of public understanding 
and rampant self-interest. Structures would be even 
more subject to abuse than the current administration 
of the RTP: 
The local community would have more 
involvement in the police in the next ten 
years but not now. We are not convinced 
that local communities have sufficient 
abilities to do that yet. During this period, 
the state needs to educate more local 
people. In other words, education of the 
public must cover every area of the 
country, even in remote areas… 
(Assistant Secretary of PRC) 
Others also felt that if the public’s representatives 
became involved in appointments and nominations it 
would cause many problems. Officers would turn to 
board members to lobby for promotions and 
promotions instead of approaching senior police 
administrators. A Station Chief said: 
I completely disagree with the public 
becoming involved in police transfer and 
nominations because local people have 
different backgrounds. They are not 
familiar with policing in the way senior 
officers are. If the public do, it will 
definitely lead to many problems. The 
police will be condemned regarding their 
activities and operations. We have to 
realize that officers have both weapons 
and laws in their hands and they also have 
the power of arrest. The police may lack 
all independence and just become the tool 
of influential local persons who are board 
members once they can influence 
decisions about appointments directly. 
(Chief of small station, Upper North) 
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The Chief was not prepared to discuss how RTP 
personnel management operated currently but implicit 
in his concerns was experience with the long-
established system of patronage and the administrative 
culture which underlay the process of appointments 
and movements among bureaucrats and the armed 
forces generally. 
In answer to the first of the two questions about 
police transparency, ‘Should the public be engaged in 
inspecting the police’s activities?’ a senior NCO who 
was near retirement said: 
The public do not really understand about 
scrutiny…Nobody loves the police in the 
way the police do. If the public were able 
to scrutinize policing, they would want to 
kill the police. Sometimes, even the police 
do not like the police.  
(Senior Sergeant Major, Investigation, smallstation, 
Upper South) 
His was a frank admission of closed institutional 
culture, lack of accountability and dubious practice. 
Another NCO with twenty years’ experience who 
worked in the same station elaborated: 
The public should not inspect policing. We 
sometimes do not want to do things but 
we have no choice. If I do not conform as 
my colleagues expect, I am not able to 
spend my life in this police society. 
Actually, I do not want to behave badly. 
Civilians should not interfere. The public is 
the problem. They do not understand us. 
(Senior Sergeant Major, interrogation, small station, 
Upper South) 
An NCO from a small police station in the North 
explained about provincial culture and the context to 
policing locally:  
How are we ensured the police will not be 
bullied by external inspectors? When 
Thais have power, they behave badly. I 
absolutely disagree with civilian 
involvement...I have experience of working 
in both Bangkok and rural areas. In rural 
areas, it is an influence-based system. 
Even the drivers of influential people are 
powerful although they graduated with a 
primary school education only. When I 
have to arrest one of those drivers, they 
tell me, you do not know who we are. In 
Bangkok, I do not care who you are 
because I can go back home when I finish 
working. 
(Sergeant Major, Suppression, small station, Upper 
North) 
In answer to the second of the interview questions 
about police transparency, ‘Should there be an 
Ombudsman’s Office specifically for police activities?’ 
the initial reaction was it would lead to more problems 
than at present: 
I think that would put a good front on 
police inspection. In reality, inspectors 
would come for money. What’s the 
problem? Take us out for fancy meals in 
five-star restaurants and explain. How 
much money did you get this month? 
Distribute some money to us too. They 
would not come to help the local police. 
The more inspections you had, the more 
money you would have to pay. And when 
it was near to the round of police 
movements, then we would have to pay 
again if there was more inspection. We 
wouldn’t be able to focus on police work at 
all. The Police Chief at [tourist location 
withheld], for example, that position costs 
7 or 8 million baht or more [US$220,000—
US$250,000]. 
(Senior Sergeant Major, section and location 
withheld) 
Some NCOs supported the idea of an 
Ombudsman’s Office but those in favour saw it as a 
means of supporting police officers when complaints 
were made against them: 
At present, offenders often complain about 
the police who arrest them. Those 
offenders receive consultations from 
lawyers. If a Police Ombudsman’s Office 
is launched, it would help good police 
officers to explain to the public or senior 
police managers what the facts are. It 
happens that the public do not believe in 
what the police say... 
Nobody knows how bad it is we have it. I 
have been complained about without 
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foundation. The internal complaints 
process takes a long time, perhaps a year 
or more. During the process of 
investigation, I felt disappointed and 
frustrated with my job because my salary 
was withheld. An external inspector would 
make this a quicker procedure and also 
transparent for the public. 
(Corporal, Traffic, small police station, Bangkok) 
Others were sure that NCOs would become 
scapegoats for their bosses’ activities if police 
administration was opened to public scrutiny. 
The PRC had not in fact proposed an 
Ombudsman’s Office for the Police in the first place 
because they saw it as having the same poor 
reputation with the public for protracted and ineffectual 
handing of complaints as the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman’s Office for the Civil Service, which 
currently included the RTP. The PRC had wanted an 
ICC to establish accountability. The recommendation 
was not part of the final Police Reform Bill which was 
submitted to the National Legislative Assembly. As the 
PRC’s Chair described events: 
‘At the Council of State, the bills – debated 
and defended by the Police Reform 
Committee – were subjected to severe 
editing. To my surprise and chagrin, many 
parts of the drafts were changed, some by 
Council members themselves. As a result, 
the edited drafts strayed from the original 
drafts that had been submitted and 
approved in principle by the Cabinet. 
Subsequently, the Police Reform Bill was 
completed – with the changes. Contrary to 
our proposal, the bill on the Independent 
Committee for Complaints against the 
Police was doomed. The suggested 
committee was placed instead as an 
internal body within the NPA [National 
Police Authority], with police officers 
serving as the secretariat.’ 
(PRC 2009:iv) 
The PRC’s Chair the interview in English with the 
observation, ‘One cannot avoid politics when 
considering police reform,’ and he elaborated in the 
preface to the much delayed English-language version 
of the PRC’s final report: 
‘The abortive police reform reflects 
Thailand’s bureaucratic quagmire caused 
by chronic political under-development. 
Although earlier governments have 
claimed that they recognized the necessity 
of re-structuring and decentralizing the 
police organization, nothing has been 
done accordingly. On the contrary, every 
government tried its best to ensure its firm 
political control of the police. Interference 
in police personnel management, 
especially regarding appointments, 
promotions and transfers, has been 
rampant... Nepotism reigns and abounds. 
Without constructive reform, the police 
cannot be expected to carry out their 
mission effectively. The public will 
continue to suffer.’ 
(PRC 2009:v—vi) 
CONCLUSION 
The findings from the study explain Retired Police 
General Vasit’s final conclusion about political 
interference and the barriers to police reform in 
Thailand and about the drivers behind the way that the 
RTP has operated in practice, and how it fails to serve 
the public, based on the opinions and accounts of the 
RTP’s own officers. Our findings about police culture 
and the intersection between policing and politics 
provide a detailed case study of the troubled 
relationship between corruption and democracy in 
Thailand (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan 1996). 
However, the paradox of the PRC’s reform strategy to 
remove political interference from the administration of 
the RTP was that its recommendations could also be 
read as politically motivated. That is, the PRC had 
been established to quasha resurgent and powerful 
RTP in the struggle between Thaksin and his political 
opponents (Connors 2008). Retired Police General 
Vasit was not independent even if the PRC’s report 
was well-informed and its recommendations well-
founded, coherent and necessary in any move towards 
more open and accountable policing in the Thai 
context. 
Bayley (2006:11) has remarked that, in general, 
‘very little attention has been given to the process ... of 
achieving police reform of a democratic character’ in 
troubled contexts in the developing world and the 
‘institutional gap’ for Thai police reform was as Vasit 
described it himself, ‘chronic political under-
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development’. Davis, Henderson and Merrick (2003: 
285) found that moving towards Western models of 
community-oriented policing, as Vasit had hoped, was 
crucially dependent on ‘local context and history’ while 
Pino and Wiatrowski (2006:8) claimed that no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ in moves away from authoritarian policing 
in quasi-military contexts, as in Vasit’s failed attempts 
to prepare the ground for ‘democratic’ policing in the 
Thai context. Bayley and Perito (2011:6) note that, 
‘Even though forms of police corruption can be reduced 
to a generic few, it does not follow that generic 
solutions will work the same everywhere.’ Vasit’s 
attempts to apply standard prescriptions against police 
corruption –establishing permanent external oversight 
and making senior managers accountable – were 
blocked as the RTP’s administration continued to be 
abused to consolidate political power post-2006. 
O’Neill, Marks and Singh (2007:2) conclude that much 
more comparative work is necessary and ‘much insight 
can be gained into policing culture by looking beyond 
the typical Anglo-American perspective.’ According to 
our own study, political self-interest, especially 
interference in personnel management within the 
RTP’s annual round of appointments, nominations, 
transfers and promotions, allied to nepotism and 
position buying for anticipated rewards, represented 
the key drivers of police culture and also the key 
barriers to police reform in the Thai context.  
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